Unpacking the connectivity straw man
Sunday, May 21, 2006 at 3:56AM
Thomas P.M. Barnett

It's been a while, so worth doing.


And yes, Robb's recent weird take on the subject prompts me to do so, and for that I am grateful, because his thinking--both good and weak--often pushes mine (as I hope I return the favor on days both good and bad).


First off, think in terms of both degree and kind when considering differences in connectivity.


Degree can be expressed in both sheer volume and sequencing/maturity. In general, states with very high levels of connectivity are those with the highest rates of regulation, social welfare, and governments with great reach but limited power (invoking Fukuyama). They also feature strong rule sets as a rule, meaning lotsa transparency and trust.


This is why the most globalized states are those that are the most developed and typically advanced democracies. These mature, well-connected states simply don't go to war with one another, but they do, under the right conditions, come together to enforce collective rules against bad actors because they see the collective good in such actions. They also tend to be incredibly resilient to all forms of disruptive threats, because all that connectivity tends to trigger lotsa horizontal structures (pol, security, econ, social).


Likewise, as a rule, states with low levels of connectivity tend to feature the opposite of all those characteristics.


When expressed as a global geographic reality that recognizes critical mass (neighborhoods good and bad), there you basically have my argument for Core and Gap.


When a disconnected state purposefully ramps up its connectivity under conditions of state control, the destabilizing elements of such increased connectivity can be somewhat controlled, although never totally erased. You cannot expose previously closed societies to outside elements and not trigger a reaction. That's simply human nature. So as I said in BFA, any rapid uptick in connectivity naturally engenders a counter-reaction, typically expressed as nationalism, usually strongest among the youngest. With time, it moderates. But if done too much too fast, the result can be something on the order of the Iranian Revolution. So speed is everything (The Train's Engine Can Travel No Faster Than Its Caboose), especially WRT reasonable expectations on pluralism, meaning, as I often state, you've got to be realistic about how most states will end up seeking to manage a steep trajectory of growing connectivity--i.e., single-party states tend to be the norm.


Is it better to pursue such a path as a democracy? Sure, assuming you're not deluded by election-driven polities that cleverly mask their genuine single-party statehood (like Japan, South Korea and Mexico did for decades).


Is such masked single-party statehood a bad thing? Well, here we get to the sequencing/maturity argument.


Moving from Gap to Core, as I wrote in BFA, is akin to moving from youth (infantilized socities suffering too little government and thus chaotic, lawless existences or similarly immature societies suffering the oppposite, or authoritarianism) to young adulthood (New Core-ish in uneven development of the rule sets associated with the highest levels of connectivity) to mature adulthood (serious market states with mature democracies). When a mature state has a plus-up in connectivity (i.e., lotsa immigration) or suffers some negative feedback from it or disruption (like 9/11), the chances for organized violence are low (then again, it's good if such harmed states can come together in the aftermath of such shocks to improve their systemic responses in terms of new rules established or responsible parties targeted for justice). These states simply possess the necessary resilience across the board to handle such challenges. So here Kant is exactly right.


Immature states facing a similar challenge are far more likely to succumb to such organized (or disorganized) violence. History says Kant is right there too.


But it's the transitioning states that naturally face the most challenges because they face more rapid and more comprehensive change. In that flux, they face the greatest dangers of heightened violence/instability. It's like they're going through the puberty of connectivity: they feel so much more than they can understand or manage. This is why the Old Core's strategy of integrating the New Core is so crucial--as in, what England did for us way back when, we need to so for China today.


So Kant is wrong as far as the journey goes (i.e., the tendency for young, fragile democracies to war), thus again my preference for pushing connectivity more economically while being patient on democracy.


So how you connect is virtually as important as that you connect.


Here we get to the issue of kind; obviously, not all connectivity is good.


I have sex with my wife and that's good connectivity. I have sex with your wife and that's bad connectivity. I have lotsa sex with lotsa your wives and that's not just bad, it can be hugely disruptive and deadly.


Now, if you want to be obtuse, here is where you ask, "Well, which is it Barnett? Is sex good or bad?"


Obviously, it depends. Within the right rule set, it creates a lot of resiliency and stability and trust. But when mass rape is employed for purposes of racial strife, then it's amazingly destructive--and that's just patently obvious to any decent human being.


When states/societies are immature--connectivity-wise--any rapid ramping of connectivity is likely to be bad, as in, bad people will take advantage of the weak rule sets to do bad things (just like criminals historically take advantage of emerging technologies until the legal system catches up). So a failed state, for example, tends to feature plenty of bad connectivity--as in crime and terror and smuggling and mafias and the like. You can look at this and say, "This proves connectivity is bad!" Or, you can simply recognize bad connectivity can flourish under bad conditions.


This feels like enough of a rundown. I consider all this stuff self-evident, meaning stuff we all just pick up from life, but then I remember how binary we Americans tend to be, so for too many of us, globalization MUST be a choice between COMPLETE INTEGRATION (and thus "universal peace") or COMPLETE DISINTEGRATION (and thus "perpetual global war"), when of course it's a yin-yang relationship (as globalization spreads, it creates tumult and violence in many traditional socities it seeks to reformat, but if survived/managed well, susequent integration drives potential violence and threats from system-level to state-level and ultimately isolates them but never quite eliminates them at the individual level).


"So which is it Barnett? Is more connectivity good or bad? Is more globalization good or bad?"


Well, it depends on whether you're in the Gap or the Core or trying to rapidly make the journey from the former to the latter.


None of this is rocket science, just common sense--as such, always worth repeating.

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