■"China Eases Rules On Stock Buying By Foreign Holders," by Kate Linebaugh, Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2006, p. A6.

■"Mitsubishi UFJ Negotiates Stake In Bank of China," by Andrew Morse, Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2006, p. A12.

The China hawks in the Pentagon and on the Hill view that country's "rise" strictly in terms of alleged "power" and "influence." They never see the liabilities, especially the internal ones. They never see the factions and divisiveness and political infighting, so they constantly misinterpret or fantastically extrapolate from their very narrow focus on military matters an entire Chinese view of the world (Yes, yes, it's all "unrestricted warfare" from here on out! As if you can't find similar bullshit from our own Fourth-Generation Warfare hard-core types.).

Worse, the hawks are never able to locate China in our own past history, seeing them only as necessarily vectoring toward some Nazi-like outcome, as if China's embrace of globalization and rapid privatization (70% of the economy is now private-sector driven) comes anywhere close to the Third Reich's very different trajectory.

Nor do these hawks ever examine the relative differences between ... say ... China's foreign policy and America's over the past several decades. I mean, which country has waged war time and time again distant from its shores, and which country has essentially acquiesced time and time again with such warfare. Recall any dramatic, Soviet-like military showdowns between the U.S. and China anywhere other than its coastline or the Taiwan Straits? In other words, where do we find China's "influence" and "infiltration" leading to superpower rivalries of an unstable sort?

Ah, we are told the Chinese are too masterful and clever for that--way too 4GW. You are thinking too crudely if you expect such things. The Chinese are doing this all indirectly, which is why we need mucho gigantic military platforms that are absurdly expensive because ... uh ... that is clearly where warfare is going, right?

Me, I see a clear trajectory with China: day-in and day-out it slowly but surely opens up its precious "communist" economy to outside economic influence and connectivity. Its political leadership, which is clearly autocratic, increasingly lets that process of growing connectivity drive a comprehensive and profound transformation of its internal economic rule sets, while trying desperately to keep itself insulated from the pluralistic impulses that process inevitably unleashes throughout society, but especially among the youth.

But seeing that economic trajectory for what it is, well, that's considered naïve and idealistic. Yes, yes, focusing on economics and capitalism and reading the WSJ, that's the naïve observer all right.

Meanwhile, clinging to dreams of great power war with China, a dream that has clearly prevailed in the current Quaddrenial Defense Review, means we change our force structure and acquisitions strategies very little, despite this Global War on Terrorism, the "long war" with radical Salafi jihadists, and the Iraq of today and the Iraqs of tomorrow--that's realism.

Or perhaps just a particular form of greed we have a hard time shaking--or should I say, Congress and the Pentagon have a hard time shaking.