■"What trans-Atlantic crisis? A common grand design underpins the major industrialized democracies," op-ed by Mohammed Ayoob, International Herald Tribune, 24 February 2005, p. 6.

■"Europeans see pluses in ending China bad: Commercial ties and diplomacy lead to dispute with U.S.," by Mark Landler, International Herald Tribune, 24 February 2005, p. 1.

■"Chinaís focus on Galileo pinpoints US security fears: Beijingís involvement in Europeís rival navigation service to GPS has Washington chiefs worried," by Raphael Minder, Financial Times, 24 February 2005, p. 16.

■"Nokia makes the call: China will be No. 1 (Chief sees it passing U.S. in next 3 years," by Chris Buckley, International Herald Tribune, 24 February 2005, p. 15.

■"Pouring oil on the East China Sea: The East Chine Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential hydrocarbon areas near large markets," by Mark J. Valencia, International Herald Tribune, 24 February 2005, p. 7.

Ayoob captures the strong sense I get from two recent trips to Europe: the trans-Atlantic bond isnít the issue to worry about. That will remain strong. Whatís going to change dramatically in coming years is both Europeís and Americaís relationships with New Core players China, India, Brazil and Russia. Yes, there will be a lot of hand-wringing over our focus on security with all these players while Europe will seem far more obsessed with forging economic ties. And if we let a focus on security put us at a long-term disadvantage with these markets, then weíll have nobody to blame other than ourselves and our leadershipís continuing tendency to think about war within the context of war instead of in the context of everything else. The Global War on Terrorism is the top security issue; but security issues simply do not dominate as much as Americans and especially the Bush administration seem to think.

Europe is going to end the arms ban on China, not because itís that hot to sell arms to China (the US remains, by far, Europeís bigger market in that regard), but because it wants that military-market nexus to pay off in deeper economic ties over time. As Landler writes:

But there is much more at stake in the decision by Europe than whether it sells French fighter jets or German submarines to Beijing: namely, broader commercial ties and some genuine diplomacy . . .

ìEurope wants to sell cars and perfume in China,î said Willem van der Geest, the director of the European Institute for Asian Studies, a research group in Brussels. ìIts nonmilitary economic objectives weigh far more in this decision than any gains it would get from selling arms.î

Israel and Russia have never honored this ban, and soon Europe wonít either, and what it adds to the military mix wonít shift much of anythingóthe economics are doing that all by itself.

China will simply connect itself up, and no matter how we might try to narrow that process to trade while downplaying any nexus to security, China will not be denied. That connectivity, like linking up with and investing in Europeís Galileo system (their rival to GPS), will define a growing military-market nexus between Europe and China. Trying to prevent that just puts us on the outside of this integration process within the Core, instead of at the middle of it. No one can steer Chinaís military emergence more than we, but we are choosing to abdicate the strategic opportunity out of fear. Weíll achieve nothing but our growing irrelevance in this process. China and India will be #2 and #3, respectively, in the global economy (measured at Parity Purchasing Power) within my professional lifetimeóeasily. So I make the point of shaping my strategic vision around an inescapable reality. As Robert Wright wrote in Nonzero: rule #1 for running the world is donít fight inevitabilities. This is geostrategic martial arts, while too many leaders around the world are stuck in some myopic balance-of-power mindset. In this, I fear we run up against the lack of imagination and vision with the Bush administration, reminding me of why I supported Kerry and Edwards in í04.

Nokia gives yet another example of why this shift in rule-set creation is undeniable: China will surpass the US as its #1 cellphone market within 3 years, according to its CEO. India is hot on its tail. China will account for roughly a quarter of global cellphone growth in the next five years, with subscribers more than doubling from 330m to 700m. And guess where most of that growth comes from? From Chinaís Gap-like interior regions. Cellphones have reached the point of being the razor you give away in order to capture the customerís demand for blades.

Are we gonna fight with China over its access to Galileo? Hardly. And Japan isnít going to fight with China over East China Sea gas and oil. Theyíre simply going to compromise, with the most logical route being Japan providing money to Chinaís exploration and development in return for cheaper prices on the resulting flow. Why? The economic relationship that develops between the two will determine the military relationship. Yes, we can talk Japan into some tough wording on Taiwan, but 10 years from now, count on Japan being more interested in pleasing Beijing on security than the United States. Weíre dreaming if we think weíre preventing that somehow. We can either lock-in on Chinaís strategic price now or let others be drawn into that economic undertow. But no missile shield nonsense is going to break those growing bonds or negate the resulting military-market nexus that China inevitably builds with both Europe and Japan.