■"Growing Pessimism on Iraq: Doubts Increase Within U.S. Security Agencies," by Dana Priest and Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 29 September 2004, p. A1.
■"The Politics of Fear: Kerry Adopts Bush Strategy of Stressing Dangers," by Jim VandeHei and Howard Kurtz, Washington Post, 29 September 2004, p. A1.
■"Rivals' Foreign Policy Stances Show Few Clear Distinctions," by James Bennet, New York Times, 30 September 2004, p. A1.
■"Kerry Is Widely Favored Abroad: Hostility Toward Bush Revealed in Surveys and Interviews," by Keith B. Richburg, Washington Post, 29 September 2004, p. A14.
It is scary to read the strategic despair that's spreading out of Iraq and across the national defense establishment. But all it really represents is the military's realization that they do not possess a winning hand there. In short, the military solution isn't enough. Defeating the insurgency is not an end, but a means to enabling the reconstruction of Iraq and its reconnection to the global economy and the world outside. But we're not winning the latter battle, so no matter how well we temporize the former situation, it doesn't spell political victory in the end, and that's what's depressing.
How do we get beyond this stalemate? We internationalize this thing like crazy. A much bigger peacekeeping/counterinsurgency force that would feature not just an Old Core, paleface cast, is the first answer. When the terrorists look across the line and see not just Americans and Europeans, but Chinese, Russians and Indians (three "civilizations" which historically have shown plenty of willingness to kill Muslims when required), the strategic despair would leave our side and begin to infect theirs.
But how to achieve this "unbelievable" proposal? How to bribe Russia, and China, and India? Maybe no Star Wars pointed against China. Maybe no outsourcing backlash against India. Or declaring Pakistan a "major, non-NATO ally." Maybe we push Russia's desire to join the WTO, then NATO in a more full fashion, and then maybe the EU itself!
No, no. All these things are too fantastic.
No, going it largely alone in the Middle East and transforming it all by ourselves, somehow integrating those economies into the Core all by ourselves. No, that's not fantastic. Cutting hugely popular deals with the Russians, Chinese, and Indians would be far more fantastic. How do I know such deals would be popular? Just by seeing how strongly foreign nations want Kerry to beat Bush, and to end the perception of US unilateralism in this profoundly connected Core.
But Kerry has a hard time making this sell, since he believes in most of the same things Bush does on the key burning security issues of our day. But that's the funny thing: all these issues that piss off potential New Core powers from helping us in Iraq are not "burning security issues," but easy give-aways if we're really serious about winning a global war on terrorism. I mean, for Christ's sake! What's more important to you? Defeating transnational terrorism or the Kyoto Treaty?
Kerry runs real risks by sounding more Chicken Little-like than Bush already does. He needs to spell out his willingness to be a real dealmaker, something Bush has never mastered nor shown any inclination to even learn. Clinton was a deal-maker and Clinton got economic issues solved during his 8 years of working globalization. Kerry needs to present himself as a Clinton-like deal-maker on security issues in the age of globalization. He needs to show not just the downside of four more years of telling our allies we don't need them. Kerry needs to show he understands there's a huge upside to successfully internationalizing this war on terror. It's win-win for as far as the eye can see. It's the happy ending the American public is desperate to hear about.