■"Putin Moves to Centralize Authority: Plan Would Restrict Elections In Russia," by Peter Baker, Washington Post, 14 September 2004, p. A1.

■"Pakistan Losing Grip on Extremists: Attacks on Officials Linked to Al Qaeda," by John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Washington Post, 29 August 2004, p. A1.

Putin is using the Beslan massacre as his own 9/11, or System Perturbation that allows him to push through some very significant tightening measures. Feeling that too many vertical political controls were snipped by reformists across the sloppy Yeltsin years, he's seeking to tighten up the very horizontally-challenged Russia (which spreads itself over more time zones than I can count).

How worried should we be? The reformists' real success in the 1990s was to snip as many vertical (or top-down) economic controls as possible. Those gains for freedom aren't being reduced by this act, even as significant political freedoms may well end up being lost for quite some time. Remember the Chinese argument I state in PNM: freedom is about 90% economic and only 10% political. When Putin moves seriously against free enterprise in Russia, then I get scared, but until then, his push to maintain his political grip may well be exactly what is required to keep Russia a functioning member of the Core. Because remember this, if Russia loses control of the Caucasus, guess who inherits that front in the GWOT?

As for Pakistan, more disturbing evidence that the government there controls little beyond the capital. High-level US officials are admitting (and I use the word "admitting" since this same administration talked openly about making Pakistan a "major, non-NATO ally" recently) that Pakistani extremists and "second-rung Al Qaeda operatives from Arab countries" are apparently growing a significant alliance in the country's ungovernable northwest territory.

Pakistan's security services grew these "home-grown militants" to employ them against the Sovs in Afghanistan (with US help) and then later in its long-running dispute with India over Kashmir (to the dismay of the US). With Musharraf saying he won't rein them in until he gets a deal on Kashmir, US patience, along with those of other allies, is growing thin. But the Pakistanis don't see it that way. Instead they feel like they're doing all they can in this GWOT and keep asking what the US is going to do for them in return.

Interesting question. What exactly would we want to do to help Pakistan?

To me, Musharraf's plea is an empty one: he says he wants to be part of the Core, but he clings to his "olive grove" with a reckless abandon that belies his stated desire. And don't cite me that "honor" argument. "Honor" is to international relations like "statistics" are to the NFL: they're for losers.