4 Stories
(1) The Branding of a Networked Opponent
The first story is about Spainís investigation into 3/11. It appears in 5 April Wall Street Journal (ìSpain Refocuses Terrorism Probe Following Arrests,î Keith Johnson and David Crawford, p. A17).
Here is the key quote, and then Iíll explain my conundrum:
ìSome of the main suspects behind the March 11 attack were third-tier figures on the fringes of a Madrid al Qaeda cell that was arrested in late 2001 for providing logistical help to the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers. Some of those suspectsí own contacts were sifted-over footnotes in other European probes.Hereís the rub: you can say al Qaeda pulled off Madridís 3/11, or you can say, ìNo, it wasnít al Qaeda, it was this obscure North Africa Islamic terrorist group.î Either way, you can be correct, depending on how you want to define a terrorist group vice a loose network of terrorist groups.
Al Qaeda, as we know, means ìthe base.î In effect, al Qaeda itself is not designed to be THE terrorist group, but the foundation of a large, transnational network of loosely affiliated Islamic groups all united by similar long-term aims, even if their individual short-term goals may be quite different and unique to their local conditions. So if a group of North Africans pull off 3/11 and in doing so, received little or no immediate help from al Qaeda, how can so many in the press and my business refer to it as an ìal Qaeda attackî?
The answer is, it fits the al Qaeda model to a ìT.î
A good analogy might be the brand name versus the individual franchises. McDonaldís is the brand, but that corporation doesnít own the individual business we associate with that name, as those are operated by franchise owners. But that brand concept is so strong, almost nobody thinks of individual franchises in that way, instead we see only the brand. Al Qaeda aspires to be that brand name of Islamic transnational terrorist that works to drive the West out of the Middle East, andóby doing soódrive the Middle East out of the world.
So the first line of my draft piece for the Post on Sunday (Outlook) begins with a line that goes something like ìAl Qaeda buys a national election in Spain for the price of 10 backpack bombsÖî When I read about Spanish officials now linking the bombing most directly to this relatively obscure North Africa terrorist group, I feel like I should use that specific ìfranchiseî name and then explain all the nuances I just enunciated here.
Except, of course, thatís not the point of the piece and it would take up too much time and effort to do that, which would possibly result in the piece losing its focus. So my instinct is simply to let it pass, because the linkages between this group and al Qaeda are enough to say, ìThis attack carries all the hallmarks of the al Qaeda brand,î if I were to write such a boilerplate sentence.
All I am trying to say here is this: the Pentagon has finally found a truly networked opponent to wage network-centric war againstóglobalization-fueled connectivity that has bred contempt. So I guess itís a case of ìbe careful what you wish for. . ..î
(2) So goes China, so goes . . .
The second story is also in WSJ, same day, page A2, entitled, ìChinaís Boom Has Flip Side for Suppliers,î by Patrick Barta. Gist of story is that China is fast becoming THE market for much of its fellow Asian statesí exports. This is the true dominating factor of China that is emerging: not its military might (which is a far cry from ours) but its economic might (or sheer weight). This economic might will make Chinaís fate the fate of basically every other economy in Asia: as falls or rises China, so too falls or rises everyone else.
This is a connectivity that the U.S. tends to fear, although it is very similarly to our own Goliath-like impact on Latin American economies, not to mention on those of our NAFTA partnersóCanada and Mexico.
My point is this: Chinaís emergence embeds it ever more within the larger web that is Asia. They all share the same fate now in a way they never did before. So if the U.S. and China go head-to-head in some future security scenario, we may find ourselves deeply surprised by which countries in Asia naturally gravitate to Chinaís side versus our own.
(3) Mutually-assured Dependence as a strategic deterence?
The third story appears side by side with Spain story mentioned earlier (WSJ, p. A17) and itís entitled, ìSingapore Leads India Charge: Southeast Asian Nations Hope to Avert Overreliance on China,î by Phillip Day.
This story simply details the natural desire of many Asian economies to balance their growing reliance on Chinaís market with that of emerging India. But like the previous story, what this one tells me is that in 5 to 10 years, if we enter some Asian security situation involving China and/or India, the economic connectivity that we bump into will be very complex and far more developed than we might assume from todayís perspective.
The sort of mutually-assured dependence that marks globalizationís Functioning Core is extending itself nicely throughout this region, with these two New Core emerging economies (China, India) serving as twin pillars. All well and good, but suggesting that any conflicts we access in this region will not be some isolated affair, easily divorced from the ìeverything elseî that is globalizationís progressive advance.
Reason, the monthly libertarian magazine will put out a June issue in which each of its 40,000 subscribers will receive a customized cover that reads ìJoe Blow [substitute any name] . . . They Know Where You Are!î The picture on each cover will be a satellite photo detailing the neighborhood of the subscriber in question, with his or her house circled!
The article describing this is found in todayís (5 April) New York Times, on p. C8: ìPutting 40,000 Readers, One by One, on a Cover,î by David Carr.
Itís all designed to scare and provoke your thinking about ìThe unsung benefits of a database nation.î
That is connectivity in the most quintessential Core society: the United States.
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, one of the most disconnected societies in the world, an entire national army, aided by the best foreign special ops guys you can name, cannot track down Osama bin Ladenóeven after months and months of trying.
That is the vast gulf between what it means to belong to the Core and what it means to be stuck in the Gap.
Amazing when you think about it. Reminds you of those 1960sí laments, ìIf they can put a man on the moon, they why canít they . . ..