■"China's Growing Undersea Fleet Presents Challenge to Its Neighbors," by David Lague, Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2004, p. A12.

■"Eyeball to Eyeball," book review by Ben MacIntyre (High Noon in the Cold War by Max Frankel and Engaging India by Strobe Talbott), New York Times Book Review, 28 November 2004, p. 9.

Another piece (WSJ) about the Chinese-Japanese nuclear sub incident that occurred earlier this month, filled with ever more warnings about how China's economic growth translates into military power.

Of course, no foreign direct investment of $50 billion a year from the outside world (really, primarily from the Old Core of the U.S., Japan, and Europe), and you'd see Chinese military spending plummet just like it did all over Asia following the Asian Flu of 1997-98. So China's "independent" military muscle is no more independent than oursóit's a luxury that requires others to essentially foot the bill.

What will China do with all these subs (around 70 by 2010)? They can threaten our attempts to threaten their attempts to threaten Taiwan following its threats of going independent. Got that?

Oh, and they can threaten shipping lanes and work to cut off the flow of energy from the Gulf to Asia.

Does all this logic sound like it emanates from a distant age? It does. But guess what? That doesn't deter the submarine commanders or commentators on either side, who just love to go on and on about this scenario, as if it had any real legs.

I'm not saying neither side lacks the right mix of bravado and stupidity to try something, just that it wouldn't last for very long. China couldn't pull off an imitation of Nazi U-boats for very long and if it tried, what would be the point? To tank its economy or ruin the last 25 years of economic development there?

Ah, but we are told that we must always take into account the irrational? Like the irrational desire of the submarine fleets on both side to justify their existence?

The U.S. submarine fleet has been smarting ever since the Sovs left the scene, and they are fairly desperate in their attempts to justify their ever-dwindling numbers.

My question is, How much do we owe the global economy versus how much do we owe the Navy's submarine community? If you're telling me that Taiwan is the source of the problem, then we need to redo the deal on Taiwan, not give in to this idiotic logic that says this conflict is inevitable simply because the sub guys on both sides are just itching to make it happen.

Smart leadership would defuse this situation now. Our historical knowledge of brinksmanship between great powers says this: "For the roots of crises, look to powerful men feeling vulnerable. It leads to belligerence."

In Taipei, powerful men feel vulnerable over that country's progressive economic integration with rising China. In Beijing, powerful men feel vulnerable over Taipei's threats to make explicit their desire to make permanent their independence from China. In Washington, outside of the Navy's submarine community, powerful men should know better.