Datelineóabove the garage, Portsmouth RI, 19April
Great article in Wall Street Journal yesterday by Greg Jaffe and others entitled "Winning the Peace: Early U.S. Decisions on Iraq Now Haunt American Efforts," 19 April, p. A1.
The subtitle says it all: "officials let looters roam, disbanded army, allowed radicals to gain strength; failure to court an ayatollah."
We were in such a huge hurry to win the war in record time with our Leviathan force that we completely opted out of any responsibility for fielding the Sys Admin, or back-half force to win the peace. That back-half force is pure MOOTW, or military operations other than war.
But the Pentagon hates MOOTW, and bringing up the realities of that sort of necessary follow-on effort is enough to get you canned, as Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki found out during the run-up to the war. His predictions about needing far more boots on the ground were obvious, but the Pentagon does not hold that two-part conversation when it plans for war. It plans for war within the context of war and hopes the everything else that follows will work itself outólike the magic cloud icon on a PowerPoint slide.
None of the mistakes cited above were inevitable and all could have been prevented with a strong Sys Admin force presence that flooded the country with boots in the immediate aftermath of the Leviathan-like U.S. military's march to, and quick conquering of Baghdadówhich was nothing less than brilliant but likewise was largely wasted by the lack of the follow-on force.
What I describe yet again is the A-to-Z military capability we need to process a politically bankrupt state like Saddam's Iraq in this Global War on Terrorism.
Here the simple rule set on success in generating that outcome:
1) the Pentagon recognizes its role as key enabler and hub for a globally-derived Sys Admin force
2) the Pentagon seeds that capability within its own forces to the point where it is conceivable that the U.S. alone could pull it off
3) when other states see the "sure thing" in this capability and the commitment of the U.S. to employ it in conjunction with other Saddam-style takedowns, and when they see our willingness to let them join either the front-half warfighting coalition or the back-half peace-making coalition with no prejudice exhibited regarding commercial access to the economy in questions (yes, the contracts), then they will seek new and expanded levels of bilateral cooperation with the U.S. in all such measures
4) when that global capability is married to the U.S. capability, we have the A-to-Z military tool kit in place
5) when that tool kit is successfully used in a situation, rule codification will result in an A-to-Z international understanding of "this is how you take down a Saddam/Mugabe/Kim successfully"
6) as that rule set gets codified, international organizations will either be designated by the relevant great powers as the locus for such future decisions, or a new one will be created (hint: it'll come from the G7/8/20, not the UN)
7) once that international organization is set up, the processing of politically-bankrupt states begins in earnest
8) once the "list" becomes known, you will see those on it alter behavior immediately in most instances, making actual military takedowns not necessary
9) as these bad actors vacate the Gap of their own free will (taking their loot with them, of course) or are pulled down violently by the Leviathan-Sys Admin combo, regional security situations inside the Gap will improve dramatically
10) as those security situations improve, just watch the international financial and business community step up to take advantage of the opportunities for new connectivity.
And yes, a future worth creating can be as simple as that.